Introduction
The past decade has witnessed remarkable growth in our understanding of the brain basis of economic decision-making. In particular, research is uncovering not only the location of brain regions where decision processes take place, but also the nature of the economically meaningful latent variables that are represented, as well as their relationship to behavior. This transition from understanding where to how economic decisions are being made in the brain has been intergrated to relating neural processes to economic models of behavior. For example, in early studies of decision-making under risk, studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) found certain regions of the brain consistently responded to choices in which outcomes were more uncertain than those where outcomes with lower uncertainty (Critchley et al. 2001) . Furthermore, patients with focal brain lesions were also found to behave abnormally to risky decisions, such that they appear to be insensitive to the uncertainty of the environment (Bechara et al. 1996; Bechara et al. 2000) . On the other hand, other regions of the brain responded greater to regions with lower uncertainty. Indeed we now know that these regions in fact respond to uncertainty in a manner consistent with standard financial models of risk, and in particular to the mean and variance of simple lotteries presented during the experiments (Preuschoff et al. 2006; Schultz et al. 2008) . Thus, some of the regions that respond to uncertainty, such as the insula cortex and the ventral striatum, in fact respond to the variance of the lotteries. In contrast, some regions that respond to lower uncertainty, including midbrain and other regions of the ventral striatum, respond to increased means of the low variance lotteries, which is only apparent after noting the quantitative relationship between mean and variance in these decisions.
More than merely informing us about the brain, evidence of such quantitative relationship allow researchers to build upon these studies and directly test predictions made by economic models of choice behavior and to test between different classes of models. A number of recent studies have been able to predict subsequent behavior of subjects using brain responses (Kuhnen and Knutson 2005) . Other studies have shown that responses in brain regions that respond to expected reward also reflect biases that have been previously documented behaviorally. For example, regions of the brain that encode expected reward, including ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, are distorted according to key predictions of prospect theory. This includes decision weights that are nonlinear in probabilities, particularly at the large and small values (Hsu et al. 2009 ), and expected rewards that are sensitive to gain/loss framing (De Martino et al. 2006) .
Similarly, in studies of social preferences, we now have ample evidence that certain brain regions respond selectively during social and strategic decision-making. Early studies of game theory have compared how brain responses differ while playing against real human opponents versus against nature, typically a computer algorithm playing a predetermined strategy (McCabe et al. 2001; Gallagher et al. 2002) . In recent years, we have begun to understand how non-pecuniary motives, such as fairness and reciprocity are reflected in specific brain regions that are consistent with quantitative predictions of behavioral models of social preferences. For example, studies showing brain regions reflect differences in self and other's payoffs, as hypothesized by inequity-aversion models (Sanfey et al. 2003; de Quervain et al. 2004) , or gini coefficient in the case of pure distribution (Hsu et al. 2008) .
Toward Deciphering Neural Computations underlying Strategic Behavior
Here we focus on the neural basis of strategic interactions, where we know much about the set of brain regions that are involved, but much less about the actual quantities that are represented or how they relate to behavior. The seminal study by Bhatt et al. (2005) compared brain activity of players while playing one-shot dominance solvable games. Subjects were asked to make choices, make predictions about the other player's choice (first-order belief), and make predictions about other player's beliefs about the subject's choice (second-order belief). Standard notions of equilibrium posit that these types of beliefs are mutually consistent. Compared choices to belief trials, brain regions including the rostral anterior cingulate and dor-solateral prefrontal cortex is activated more when subjects are making choices compared to forming beliefs. More interestingly, in trials where subjects are "in equilibrium", i.e., when choices, beliefs, and second-order beliefs are mutually consistent, the ventral striatum is more activated relative to trials out of equilibrium. These provide tantalizing evidence that even theoretical notions of equilibrium can be reflected in the brain.
There is also evidence that distinct brain systems are involved in different strategic contexts. For example, a recent study compared brain activity while playing dominance solvable games versus pure coordination games (Kuo et al. 2009 ). In contrast to the step-by-step deliberation involved in playing dominance solvable games, equilibrium concepts provide little guidance over how players should behave in pure coordination games. Instead, players are often able to successfully coordinate on focal points through a "meeting of the minds" that go beyond the mathematics of the game. It was found that whereas frontal and parietal systems were engaged in dominance solvable games, coordination games engaged the insula and anterior cingulate cortices. The involvement of the frontal and parietal cortices in dominance solvable games is consistent with known role of these regions in working memory and mental arithmetic, respectively. On the other hand, the insula and ACC have been previously implicated in empathy and emotional states, which is consistent with the role of "intuition" in pure coordination.
However, there are a number of challenges to studying the quantities represented in these brain regions and to connect the brain to strategic behavior in a mechanistic manner. In particular, we know very little about what actually goes on inside the frontal and parietal cortices during the step-by-step deliberations involved in dominance solvable games, or what are the features of the game that ACC and insula represent to allow for the "meeting of the minds". One significant hurdle in this endeavor is the fact that standard equilibrium models are often poor predictors of behavior . In most experiments, at least for the first few rounds, observed behavior is far from (any) equilibrium. Fortunately, this has been a topic of intense research in behavioral and experimental economics in the past two decades. Central to this approach is the idea that equilibria do not emerge spontaneously, but rather through some adaptive process whereby organisms evolve or learn over time (Fudenberg and Levine 1998; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) . As Roth & Erev (1995) noted, "No one can look widely at experimental data without noticing that experience matters… So it is natural to consider how well we can explain observed behavior in terms of adaptation." Here we review recent efforts, including both our own work (Zhu et al. 2012 ) and those of others (Behrens et al. 2008; Hampton et al. 2008) , toward a more quantitative, model-building approach to understand the neural underpinnings of strategic behavior by studying the adaptation process itself.
Implications for Economic Models of Strategic Behavior
Strategic learning has been the subject of intense study in economics at both theoretical and experimental levels. Not surprisingly, a number of different learning models have been proposed. One practical implication is that decision-makers implementing different learning rules will exhibit different types of behavior. It has long been appreciated, however, that it is often difficult to distinguish between these different strategies using behavioral choice data alone (Salmon 2001) . Laboratory studies, by employing tight control over the decision environment of subjects, provide perhaps the best-case scenario for identifying learning processes underlying choice behavior. Even in these ideal circumstances, however, accurately identifying the underlying data generating process can be challenging.
For example, Salmon (2001) fitted various learning models with simulated choice data and found that a number of learning rules besides the true data generating process can provide statistically satisfactory fit, resulting in large Type I or Type II error when testing for the true model. The practical implication of these findings is summarized succinctly in Salmon (2001) . Moreover, as our models become more sophisticated and complex, the number of involved latent variables invariably grows, thus making model discrimination even more difficult . Neuroimaging data thus provide an additional source of information for identifying the underlying strategic learning process. Strategic learning, like all decision-making problems, involves information processing in the brain. Different learning models are built upon different assumptions about what information is taken into account and how optimization is taken place given the information. By directly observing the brain, neuroimaging data potentially allow us to discriminate among these competing hypotheses by identifying the neural representations of these latent representations, e.g., beliefs.
"If the goal of the research is to find a model that has a high in-sample
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews early applications of models of learning inspired from animal behavior to strategic contexts. In addition, we discuss the growing evidence that a specific variant of reinforcement learning is very literally implemented in a key part of the brain that is intimately involved in learning about rewards and punishments. In section 3, we discuss more cognitive sophisticated models of strategic learning, such as fictitious play, models in which players best respond to beliefs of other players' actions, as well as what we know about the neural basis of belief formation. In Section 4, we illustrate, using our own work as an example, the effort to understand the neural basis of strategic learning. Central to this approach is the application of the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) framework that combines both types of learning in a single unified framework. Furthermore, we discuss the practical challenges in applying this approach to the brain, and discuss the major behavioral and neuroimaging results. In Section 5, we conclude with a discussion of the relevance of these results to the various disciplines and the open questions that are raised.
2
Reinforcement Learning: From Animal Behavior to Game Theory
Applying Reinforcement Learning to Strategic Learning
Before discussing models of reinforcement learning, we first consider the shared adaptive problems of organisms and how the brain has been shaped by evolution to solve these problems. All organisms must seek out food, avoid predators, and procreate. In this sense, the basic adaptive problems faced by organisms are highly similar. For example, in the classic reward learning scenario studied in animal behavior, organisms need to behave appropriately to acquire reward (e.g., food, money, sex) while at the same time avoid harmful consequences (e.g., starvation, injuries) (Schultz et al. 1997) . Not surprisingly given its fundamental role in survival, brain systems involved in these types of behavior are highly conserved in evolution. This conservation across species have allowed for a wealth of studies across multiple species and experimental methods.
One popular model-based account of such behavior is reinforcement learning, which approximates the optimal solution for a wide range of decision problems in unfamiliar, uncertain, and non-strategic environments (Sutton and Barto 1998) . Reinforcement learning models have a long and astonishingly wide application across experimental psychology to artificial intelligence. Loosely inspired by animal studies of learning from experimental psychology, it has since become widespread in optimal control and machine learning. Broadly, RL models assume that in order to maximize the total reward, choices that have led to higher rewards in the past are more likely to be repeated in the future. More specifically, it assumes that actions that yielded the most payoff in the recent past is associated with higher expected reward and hence be selected with higher chance in the future.
On the surface, RL models may appear to be a poor description of strategic behavior. RL models lack many of the hallmarks of strategic behavior. Notably, RL players do not keep track of beliefs about actions of others, but rather merely keep track of the history of their own payoffs. Nevertheless, this class of models was among the first to be successfully used in fitting the laboratory observations in various repeated game settings. This ranges from normal form to extensive form games, and those with complete and incomplete information (Roth and Erev 1995; Erev and Rapoport 1998; Rapoport and Amaldoss 2000) . For example, Erev and Roth (1998) showed that even the simplest reinforcement learning model was able to better capture experimental observations in a 2x2 games with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium than Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the success of this class of models is such that Erev and Roth (1998) explicitly invoked the animal learning literature as a "principal criteria" in choosing a model of the intermediate dynamics of game play, and that predictions of the model "should be consistent with the robust properties of learning observed in the large experimental psychology literature on both human and animal learning."
Reinforcement Learning in the Brain
The relative success of reinforcement learning in capturing adaptive dynamics in strategic games has taken on particular relevance given what we now know about brain regions that are critically involved in learning about reward. The intimate relationship between brain and reward has been appreciated by neuroscientists since the accidental discovery of the midbrain dopamine neurons in the 1950s. The seminal work by Olds and Milner (1954) found that rats would repeatedly visit the locations where they received direct electrical stimulation of mid-brain regions dense in dopamine neurons. It is also found by later studies that when rats were allowed to press a foot lever to stimulate this particular brain region, they would do so in preference to food, drink, or mate. Conversely, blocking dopamine has the effect of removing the reward contingent on an animal's choices. For example, Berridge (1998) demonstrated the extinction of responding to food reward as if the reward is absent, when animal is deprived of dopamine.
Over the past decades, researchers have further elucidated the role of this brain region in decision-making. A series of studies by Schultz and colleagues were particularly influential in moving beyond the relatively naïve hypothesis of reward encoding in mid-brain dopamine neurons. These single neuron recordings in monkeys used a classical conditioning task where monkeys learned to associate a stimulus (e.g., light) with a reward (e.g., juice). Contrary to the simple reward encoding hypothesis, the dopaminergic neurons fired in response to reward delivery only in early trials. Once the monkey learned the association between the light and juice, activity in the neurons shifted to the onset of the light. Moreover, the firing rate of the neurons fell below baseline if the light was followed by the omission of the juice reward (Fig.1 ). (Schultz, Dayan, and Montague 1997) However, only in the past two decades are we starting to uncover the underlying latent representations. This thus holds the promise that allows us to directly observe previously as-if quantities of interest. The recent application of computational models of reinforcement learning (RL) has been instrumental in connecting dopamine and frontal-basal ganglia circuits to these forms of goal-directed behavior, as well as other function including motivation and behavioral vigor (Schultz et al. 1997; Maia and Frank 2011) . Central to this approach is the idea that dopamine neurons do not react to the reward per se, but rather they implement a form of temporal difference (TD) reinforcement learning in which prediction and evaluation are separated in time (Schultz et al. 1997) . Specifically, learning is driven by a "reward prediction error" representing the difference between the received reward and the predicted reward.
Figure 1 Changes in dopaminergic neurons resembles reward prediction errors when monkeys performing a conditioning task to associate a stimulus (e.g., light) with a reward (e.g., juice). (A) Dopaminergic neurons respond to
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where and are the predicted and received reward at time , respectively, and is the learning rate (Sutton and Barto 1998; Daw and Doya 2006) . Although much is still unexplored, this type of "predictor-corrector" models, whereby the system forms predictions and learned through minimizing errors, has found wide support. More recently, a host of studies in the past decade, combining fMRI and animal studies, have expanded the range of this basic system. For example, the learning rate has been found to be sensitive to uncertainty in the nonstationary environment. One theoretical proposal is that organisms are sensitive to risk as in models of risk in finance. There, the learning rate is proportional to the size of the variance. The value function itself, similar to expected utility theory, need not be linear in the size of the reward. Indeed, there is good reason to think that the nervous system itself operates at a log scale rather than linear scale to maximize the efficiency of information transmission. McClure,et al., (2003) The TD reinforcement model provides a flexible framework for studying the brain mechanisms underlying a variety of conditions. Over the past decade, it has proved remarkable success in its application to the study of neural systems underlying decision-making and learning. In particular, it forms one of the foundational results in the rapid growing field of neuroeconomics, and has been found to be robust across a range of species including humans and nonhuman primates as well as experimental conditions (Fiorillo et al. 2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2006; Rangel et al. 2008) . For example, Fig. 2 shows the result of an early study of brain regions that responds to the TD prediction errors in a passive learning task. In this study, McClure, et al. (2003) scanned human subjects while they underwent a classical conditioning paradigm in which associations were learned between visual stimuli (a flash of light) and the time of reward delivery (juice). Subjects were then exposed to low frequency of "error" trials, in which the delivery of reward is delayed beyond the time expected from the previous training session. They found that unpredicted delivery was associated with greater activities in some brain region (ven-V t r t t  tral striatum) than predicted reward delivery, which suggests that computations described by TD learning are expressed in the human brain during this learning task.
3
Beyond Reinforcement: Belief Learning and Theory of Mind
Belief Learning Models and Strategic Learning
Despite their successes, standard RL models miss important aspects of the strategic interaction problem. As has been widely noted, organisms blindly exhibiting RL behavior in social and strategic settings are essentially ignoring the fact that their behavior can be exploited by others (Hampton, Bossaerts et al. 2008; Lee 2008) . Moreover, given its origins in animal studies of behavior, a reinforcement learner is predicted to be insensitive to opponent's choices or the structure of the game, beyond the received payoffs . However, in a number of cases, such as coordination games, participants clearly respond to not only the received payoffs but also the strategies of the other players .
A more sophisticated approach involves forming beliefs about the future behavior of other players, and then maximizing one's payoff by best responding to these beliefs. Such an approach dates back Cournot (1838), who introduced the first explicit model of learning in games, where a player is assumed to best respond to the opponent's most recent actions. Players' beliefs, however, may be highly general, encompassing those representing social information such as reputation, to recursive beliefs in the form of "I think that you think that I think…" (Fudenberg and Levine 1998; ).
Here we focus on the restricted case where beliefs consist of one's forecasts of other players' actions-i.e., first order beliefs. This is an elementary form of mentalization and is highly tractable and forms the foundations of a number of models in theoretical biology and game theory (Fudenberg and Levine 1998; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) . The simplest version of this type of learning models is fictitious play, which assumes that in a repeated normal form game agents use the empirical frequencies of opponent's historical choices as the basis of their beliefs and best response to it. Mathematically, this corresponds to Bayesian learners who believe opponents' play is drawn from a stationary but unknown distribution, and whose prior beliefs take the form of a Dirichlet distribution (Fudenberg and Levine 1998) . It has been shown that fictitious play model performs well when environment is stationary or approximately stationary Levine 2009). Fudenberg (1993) justified such stationary assumption by appealing to a large population of players with anonymous random matching, which results in the low probability of playing with the same opponent in the future and hence eliminate the incentive to influence opponent's choices at the cost of current payoffs. Experimentally, belief learning models under random matching protocol has been examined extensively and shown to have substantial explanatory power in laboratory tests (Crawford 1995; Cheung and Friedman 1997) .
Belief Formation and the Brain
In contrast to the plethora of evidence linking reinforcement learning to dopamine and associated brain regions, we have a much less specific understanding of how the brain allows us to acquire and update beliefs. Furthermore, unlike learning about acquiring rewards and punishments, it is questionable whether studies of the neural systems of social behavior in nonhuman animals can be generalized to people. The nature of social interactions is highly variable across species, and the neural systems underlying social interactions likely emerged independently several times throughout evolutionary history (Brothers 2002; Shultz and Dunbar 2007) . For example, honeybees are able to communicate with each other through elaborate dance rituals (Seeley 1995) . Furthermore, the brains of these bees also differ depending the social versus solitary status of the bee. What differentiates the human species is the flexibility of the human brain to engage in complex form of social interactions that is unmatched in the animal kingdom, ranging from relatively simple bilateral bargaining to financial markets with many players.
One possibility is that there exists special neural circuitry that is dedicated to the formation and updating of beliefs. Indeed this is the view taken in prominent theories of mentalization, or "theory of mind" (Amodio and Frith 2006; Saxe 2006) . This refers broadly to our ability to infer the actions, intentions, beliefs, or emotions of other people, and has been a subject of intense study among neuroscientists who study social cognition. Note however that these notions of mentalization and beliefs are much broader than those typically considered in game theory, which typically refers to some vector of probabilities describing the likelihood of actions within the strategy set. In contrast, mentalization refers to the general ability of individuals to simulate mental models of other players. This literature highlights three brain regions that are consistently engaged during mentalization tasks-left and right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex. Broadly, the former is largely activated when subjects think about the thoughts of others, whereas the latter is activated to a broader set of mental activities, including thinking about the internal states or other socially relevant information of others (Amodio and Frith 2006; Saxe and Powell 2006) .
To underscore just how differently social neuroscientists study belief formation and inference relative to those in experimental economics, consider the following example of a mentalization task used in Saxe and Powell (2006) In this story, participants need to solve what is referred to as a second-order false belief task. The participant should infer that Max's mother would falsely belief that Max believed the chocolate was in the cupboard. There are, however, compelling reasons to believe that these "social" brain regions are involved in strategic behavior. Using a p-beauty contest, Coricelli and Nagel (2009) found that the activity in medial prefrontal cortex was greater when subjects played against a human opponent as opposed to a computer opponent who played randomly, and furthermore differed between high and low-level of reasoning. In contrast, the temporo-parietal junction was activated across both high and low-level reasoners. Coricelli and Nagel, 2009) Moreover, there is also good reason to believe that the functions subserved by these regions are intimately connected with RL systems that underlie more basic reward learning. The mPFC is part of the cortical-subcortical loops that are intimately connected to reinforcement learning (Mega and Cummings 1994; Tekin and Cummings 2002) . Given that ultimately such signals may eventually be outputted into observable behavior, it stands to reason that the inputs and computations of these regions converge at some level. This is also consistent with recent proposals involving so-called "model-based" reinforcement learning, where agents are now required to take into account the structure of the game and/or mental models of other individuals in social settings (Daw and Doya 2006; Ito and Doya 2011) .
Figure 3 Different regions of the medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in strategic thinking in the p-Beauty Contest (Adapted from
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Characterizing Neural Basis of Reinforcement and Belief Learning: A Hybrid Approach
Experience-Weighted Attraction
Although neuroimaging studies of belief formation and inference have shown where the different mental processes are being engaged in during game playing, they tell us little about whether these brain regions process economically meaningful latent variables. A large part of our goal therefore is to study how, and to what extent, is the "social brain" involved in the computation of strategic behavior, and to what extent does it interact with more basic neural systems involved in learning about rewards and punishments.
Fortunately, the connection between RL and belief learning has already been well-studied at the theoretical level through the seminal experience-weighted attraction (EWA) framework developed in a series of papers by Camerer and Ho (Camerer and Ho 1999; Ho et al. 2007) . A key insight of EWA is the recasting of belief-based learning into reinforcement learning using foregone payoffs. It makes clear the fact that both reinforcement and belief learning can be thought of as a generalized reinforcement framework, in which organisms learn using both received and counterfactual payoff information. Interestingly, models similar to EWA have been proposed in the machine learning literature as "off-policy" learning (Sutton and Barto 1998) . Because EWA will form much of the theoretical backbone of our approach, we will go into the model at some length.
Denote as strategy k for player i, is the chosen strategy by player i at period t, and is the chosen strategy of the opponent at period t. Player i 's expected reward, , for playing strategy in period t is governed by three parameters and updates according to the following:
(1) where parameter and function capture different aspects of the depreciation of . For example, if the player believes his opponent is a fast adaptor, he will have a small that depreciates past values faster. In contrast, is the discount rate for the strength of past
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If is large, the out-of-game prior beliefs will wear off quickly. The third and most importantly parameter for our study, , is the weight between foregone payoffs and actual payoffs when updating values. This corresponds to one of the key insights of the hybrid model that belief learning is equivalent to a model whereby actions are reinforced by foregone payoffs in addition to received payoffs as in RL models. Thus can be interpreted as a psychological inclination toward belief learning (Camerer and Ho 1999) . That is, the hybrid model reduces to the RL model when , and the belief learning model when .
In belief learning, we also impose the restriction that the initial attractions are expected payoffs given some underlying probabilistic belief inference of the subject, that is, , where is player i's initial belief about the likelihood of his opponent adopting . Hence and . The restriction ensures that in all the trials that follow the belief learners update a probabilistic belief inference regarding the opponents' next move rather than an unconstrained vector of fictive errors defined as the discrepancy between forgone payoffs and previous attraction values.
To further connect the EWA framework to the brain, we next convert the standard quantitative learning models into the TD forms, where reward predictions and prediction errors are separated into different components. As discussed above, the TD form has been highly popular in computational neuroscience, and forms the bedrock of much of our current understanding of how the brain learns through experience. EWA can be transformed into the following forms for updating attractions under the restriction of . This is a mild restriction, and it has been shown to have little effect on empirical fit across a number of datasets (Ho, Camerer and Chong 2007) .
That is, we separated player 's expected reward, , for playing strategy in period t into a reward prediction and the prediction error that is the difference between the expected reward and obtained (foregone) reward . In the hybrid model, this becomes:
In contrast, RL updates by reinforcing only the chosen strategy, whereas belief learning updates by reinforcing all available strategies proportional to the possible rewards: RL :
Finally, to convert attractions into choices, we use a logit or softmax function to calculate the probability of player i playing strategy k in the next rounds, i.e.
, where is a measurement of subjects' sensitivity to attractions.
Pragmatics of Our Approach
Although conceptually straightforward, there are a number of statistical and logistic challenges to using this framework to characterize the neural correlates of strategic learning. Statistically, strategic learning models, particularly EWA, place high demands on the quality and quantity of data. Previous econometric studies have found that games with many choices have superior statistical properties than smaller games (Salmon 2001) , which appear borne out in experimental studies (Erev and Rapoport 1998; Feltovich 2000) . This is notable in that the few previous studies of neural basis of strategic learning, in both humans and non-human animals, have used 2x2 games, the smallest non-trivial games (Dorris and Glimcher 2004; Hampton et al. 2008; Lee 2008) . Besides the consideration from statistical estimation point of view, the foregone payoff and the received payoff are highly negatively correlated in such small games with only two possible out-
comes given what opponent has selected. This makes it impossible to separate the signals associated with foregone payoffs and realized payoffs.
Games with many strategies and possible outcomes, however, can take a long time to play and to process cognitively. In the experimental economics literature on learning, sessions exceeding an hour are typical, and up to two hours are not unusual (Rapoport and Amaldoss 2000; . Such durations are clearly unfeasible in the context of neuroimaging studies. The solutions are: (1) to acquire data for a fewer number of rounds, or (2) complete part of the behavioral experiment outside the scanner. Neither is ideal. Another serious concern is the extended duration of the decisions themselves, often exceeding 10 sec, in some cases minutes. This makes it difficult to implement event-related analyses of the functional data. We believe that these factors have contributed to the lack of evidence found for the presence of belief-based learning signals in previous studies (Lee et al. 2005; Hampton et al. 2008) . In contrast, we show in our preliminary data strong evidence for the existence of such regions.
Figure 4 The patent race game. Players are given an endowment to invest (gray squares). Player who invests more receives the potential prize (green squares) plus portion of her endowment not invested. Player who invests less receives only the portion of her endowment not invested. In case of tie neither player receives the prize. Compare (A) the standard representation of the patent race game with (B) our alternative
To overcome these challenges, we used the "patent race game", first studied experimentally by Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) . This game is simple in motivation but rich in the strategic nuances and the patterns of behavior that it can generate. In the game, two players are randomly matched from a large pool of players at the beginning of each round and compete for a prize by choosing an investment (in integer amounts) from their respective endowments. The player who invests more wins the prize and the other loses. In the event of a tie, both lose the prize. Players keep the part of their endowment that is not invested. In the particular payoff structure that we use, the prize size is 10, and players are of two types: Strong and Weak. The Strong player has 5 units to invest, resulting in the strategy set, whereas the Weak player has 4 units to invest, with a resulting strategy set of (Fig. 3) . The large strategy space of this 6x5 game improves the recovery of key parameters in learning models (Salmon 2001) . Theoretical game theory predicts that the game has a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which strong players invest five 60% of the time, one and three 20% of the time respectively, and weak players invest zero 60% of the time, two or four 20% of the time.
We redesigned the interface of the patent race game by taking the standard matrix form representation that contains 60 elements and replacing it with a display that directly reflects the logic of the game. This speeded up game play considerably. For example, subjects took over 2 hours to run through 160 rounds of this particular game (Rapoport and Amaldoss 2000) . In contrast, our data showed that subjects were able to complete 160 rounds in around 30 minutes. Including typical inter-stimulus intervals (ISI) values of fMRI experiments, almost all subjects were able to complete the scanning session in 40 minutes.
Figure 5 Timeline of experiment. After a fixation screen of between 4-8 sec, (A) the subject is presented with the patent race game for between 1-2sec, (B) the subject is able to make a self-paced decision once the dashed line turns from red to gray by pressing buttons mapped to the investment amounts. After 2-6sec, the opponent's choice is revealed. (C) If the investment amount is strictly greater than that of the opponent, the subject wins the prize. (D) Otherwise the subject loses the prize. In either case the subject keeps the portion of the endowment that was not invested
The timeline of experiment is as follows. After a fixation screen of a random duration, distributed uniformly random between 4-8s, subjects are presented with the patent race game for between 1-2s (Fig. A) . Subjects are allowed to make a decision once the dashed line turns from red to gray (Fig. B) . Subjects input the decision by pressing a button mapped to the desired investment amount. The possible investments are for the strong player and for weak. All decisions are self-paced. After 2-6s, if the investment amount is strictly greater than that of the opponent, the subject wins the prize (C). Otherwise the subject loses the prize (Fig. D) . In either case the subject keeps the portion of the endowment that was not invested.
Neural Systems underlying Strategic Learning
To relate the learning algorithm to brain activity, we first fit each learning algorithm to behavior separately, then used the best-fitting estimates of each learning algorithm to generate regressors containing prediction errors for each subject on each trial. The results of behavioral estimation suggest a couple of important features. Firstly, consistent with previous empirical studies, EWA model on average outperforms both reinforcement and beliefbased in fitting the behavioral data at the individual level. Fig. 6 uses simulated play based on best-fitting estimates to show a subject who clearly exhibits both aspects of reinforcement and belief-based learning. The notable aspects of this plot is that reinforcement model misses the increased probability of investing 4 in rounds 20-40 (Fig. 6C ), but this is captured by the belief-based learning model (Fig. D) . On the other hand, the belief-based learning model overestimates the probability that investment 4 will be selected in rounds 40-60 (Fig. D) , whereas this is not the case with the reinforcement model (Fig. C) . These are precisely the features of the two models that EWA combines (Fig. B) .
The prediction error signals generated by the learning models were used as regressors on neural activity acquired at the time of the outcome. That is, using our models of strategic learning, calibrated on the observed behavior at an individual level, we infer the set of latent variables, e.g., prediction error, expected payoff, that are hypothesized to drive behavior on a trial-by-trial level. We then searched for these latent variables in the brain using statistical parametric mapping (SPM) to identify brain regions in which neural activity was significantly correlated with these quantities. In this way, we were able to probe the information contents of particular brain regions and relate them directly to relevant economic models of choice. Figure 6 Comparison of trial-by-trail empirical frequency and model prediction for a subject exhibiting both RL and BB learning ( = 0.47 EWA, RL, and BB models, respectively Using this approach, we were able to characterize a number of different notions of prediction errors that the EWA framework hypothesized (Zhu et al. 2012) . First, we found that the reinforcement prediction error signal correlates with activity in the ventral striatum bilaterally (Fig. A) . This result is consistent with the known role of the striatum in reward learning and representing reward prediction errors in many previous studies on reward conditioning (McClure et al. 2003; O'Doherty 2004 ).
Next we searched for regions showing responses consistent with the prediction error signal from belief-based learning. Two versions of prediction error signals were considered. The first one was inspired by Cournot competition, which is based on the assumption that players believe opponents will repeat previous actions. Under a TD framework, this corresponds to thee prediction error defined as the discrepancy between the highest possible payoff and the received payoff, which is also regarded as one-period regret in some previous studies (Lohrenz et al. 2007 ). The second type of prediction errors was generated from the conventional weighted fictitious play model. It captures the difference between the received payoff and the expected payoff based on the weighted empirical frequency of opponent's choices.
We found that Cournot error appears to be correlated only with activity in the bilateral putamen (Fig. B) , whereas the prediction errors from the belief-based learning model significantly correlate with the activity of both the bilateral putamen and a large region that extends across the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Fig. C) . This finding differs with the previous studies on learning with no strategic or social motivations, where activations in ACC and mPFC are typically absent. In contrast to striatal activity, the ACC, particular the rostral portions found in our study, and mPFC are more commonly associated with higher order executive functions such as control (Botvinick et al. 2004; Badre 2008) and mentalizing (Hampton et al. 2008; Coricelli and Nagel 2009) , respectively. To test the robustness of the result, we also simultaneously included the reinforcement prediction error and the orthogonalized belief-based prediction error in the model with both regressors time-locked to the moment when outcome is revealed. We verified that the result is robust against the variation of regression models. One notable aspect of strategic learning is the individual differences among the players. This is apparent from inspection of the learning dynamics, and moreover captured by our model estimates Fig. C . We thus examine the individual differences in the degree of belief-based learning within our subject group, by comparing the difference in the estimated value of obtained from individual EWA estimations and correlating that with neural activity elicited only by the belief-based prediction error signal. A significant between-subject correlation is found in the ACC and part of the mPFC. This result suggests that among subjects who assign higher weights to belief-based learning, the prediction error signals derived from their belief-based model correlated better with their neural activities in the ACC and the mPFC. The scatter plot in the lower right panel of C shows this is indeed the case. Further analysis is conducted on the between-subject variability in the degree to which the dual-process is mediated. Because subjects who have interior values of will require cognitive mediation of the respective learning signals, we used the to approximate the level of such cognitive mediation between the dual-process of learning for each subject. Brain regions involved in mediating the dual-process will correlate more strongly with the orthogonalized EWA prediction error signal for subjects employ such cognitive mediation when compared with subjects that do not. We conduct between subjects analysis to look for the regions in which neural betas for the orthogonalized EWA prediction errors correlates with . Mediating signals are found to significantly covary with the orthogonalized EWA prediction errors across subjects in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (B), revealing these regions possible importance in mediating the balance between reinforcement and belief-based learning.
Discussion
In order to test for the strategic learning process among a set of candidate models, the conventional method is to compare the in-sample explanatory power of different competing models. This runs into problems when two or more competing models provide qualitatively similar predictions about behavior. Here by taking the advantage of recent breakthroughs in understanding of the neural underpinnings of decision-making, we provide a new dimension of data and a biologically plausible criterion for understanding the strategic learning process. By disentangling the unique contributions of various candidate learning models at neural level, we aim to (1) distinguish the underlying strategic learning process more accurately, and to (2) leverage the neural representations to provide insights on the nature of the latent variables encapsulated in the different economic models of behavior.
Here we explored this approach through the specific instance of strategic learning by investigating the following two questions. First, does there exist neural mechanisms that encode learning signals in the manner predicted by economic models of strategic learning? Second, if so, does there exist a single unified neural system that drives strategic learning, or is behavior driven by inputs from possibly separable systems? Unlike previous studies of strategic learning, we designed our study to minimize collinearity in the outputs associated with the different models under consideration. We found that human participants learn though separate reinforcement and beliefbased processes. These distinct signals were represented in both overlapping and distinct brain regions. Our study is therefore the first that provides evidence for model-based belief learning in a competitive game.
More specifically, we found that several learning signals-reinforcement, Cournot, and belief-based prediction errors-all appear to be represented in the ventral striatum. A number of previous neuroimaging studies on non-strategic reward learning found that activity in the ventral striatum to be correlated with reward prediction error (McClure et al. 2003; O'Doherty et al. 2004 ). Second, we found regions that dissociate between reinforcement and belief-based learning. In particular, we found that belieflearning signals were encoded in the anterior cingulate (ACC) and the medial prefrontal cortices (mPFC). This finding differs with the previous studies on learning with no strategic or social motivations, where activations in ACC and mPFC are typically absent. In contrast to striatal activity, the ACC, particular the rostral portions found in our study, and mPFC are more commonly associated with higher order executive functions such as control (Botvinick et al. 2004 ) and mentalizing (Coricelli and Nagel 2009) . Given extensive reciprocal anatomical connections between the striatal and more prefrontal regions, it is difficult to hypothesize the degree to which either or both regions are necessary for representation of foregone payoffs/beliefs. Disentangling this therefore requires techniques capable of assessing causality, such as using patients with focal brain damage. Finally, we also provide evidence that suggest the involvement of the DLPFC and IPL in such a mediating process. Specifically, individuals that exhibited both reinforcement and belief-based learning behaviorally showed greater activation in the DLPFC and IPL than those who exhibited primarily reinforcement or belief-based learning. This is consistent with previous studies that implicate DLPFC and IPL in cognitive regulation (Badre 2008) .
Open Questions
Given the novel nature of this approach, there are a number of open questions and avenues of exploration. We highlight two in particular that we believe will be critical in advancing the interplay between economics and neuroscience. First, neuroscientific data may be used to endogenize key parameters of models of strategic learning. In EWA, for example, the interaction between reinforcement and belief learning is captured by an exogenous parameter (in self-tuning EWA, this parameter is replaced by a function, but the point remains the same). Likewise, the speed of forgetting past attractions is also determined exogenously. We believe that these parameters will be at least partially determined by interactions between key brain systems and neurotransmitters involved in learning. This can be studied, for example, through causal manipulations of these systems, either through pharmacological interventions (Eisenegger et al. 2009 ) or lesion patients (Hsu et al. 2005) .
Second, there is the real question of how to model higher-order learning when players are able to form reputation and/or communicate. Currently, our models of strategic learning can be largely separated into two types. First, there are backward looking models of learning, which includes EWA, reinforcement, and belief learning. Second, there are equilibrium models, which essentially assumes that all learning has already taken place. Intermediate approaches have been proposed that blend aspects of both types (e.g., Camerer et al. 2002; Hampton et al. 2008) , but these models require rather strict assumptions about the type or steps of reasoning players can make. For example, Camerer et al. (2002) assumes that the population of players consists of a mixture of backward-looking adaptive learners and "sophisticated" players that are essentially standard game theoretic agents. Hampton et al. (2008) assumes that all players look one step, and only one step, into the future, and form second order beliefs about how the player's action will affect the future action of the opponent. Although challenging, we propose that future research can use the neural activity to characterize the latent cognitive structure of players, such as a player's capacity for iterative reasoning, or the player's speed of adaptation.
In summary, our results have important implications for both economics and neuroscience. For neuroscience, we provide a potentially useful paradigm to study social and learning deficits in a variety of mental and neurological illnesses. For economics, we show how a combination of traditional laboratory experiments and newly available methods from neuroscience can provide novel data about latent decision-making processes. This will potentially allow us to improve predictive power of econometric models of learning dynamics in laboratory and field settings.
